arena. First, we show that Croatian voters on the whole are fiscally liberal. They substantially reward incumbents for higher spending. More importantly, we also show that the level of fiscal liberalism is strongly conditioned by the level of population's exposure to war violence. The electoral premium incumbents receive from voters for higher spending rises together with the increase in their municipality's exposure to war violence, regardless of any pre-war patterns in economic development, government spending, or investments. Finally, our analysis shows that these voting trends exhibit little sign of abating over time, even two decades after the end of the war. This is a testament not only to the depth of challenge presented by post-war reconstruction and recovery, but also to the comprehensive -and thus far neglected -impact war continues to exert on social and political life long after the bloodshed has ended.
Subnational elections and voters' preferences: Fiscally liberal or conservative?
Public choice literature has largely settled on a cynical interpretation of the relationship between office holders and voters. Classical studies in this body of work have established that politicians are office-seekers (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 ) whose utility function is primarily concerned with maximising the probability of their re-election (Downs, 1957) , followed by their inherent desire to extract rents from public budgets (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Ferejohn, 1986) . It has furthermore been suggested that, in order to advance these goals, politicians use various categories of public spending with a specific desire to 'buy votes,' thus engaging in clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013) . In local politics, lower transparency, and consequently lower accountability of public officials, has been shown to make clientelistic behaviour even more successful (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005) . The extensive literature on voter choice on the subnational level has been focused on several avenues through which local politicians misuse the budgets at their disposal to improve their re-election chances, but the most researched aspect of the whole story has been the effect of higher spending (and thus greater budget deficits) on local incumbents' electoral chances. This is the area of the public choice literature which is largely still divided between two competing interpretations of the relationship between voters and policy makers.
One could trace the origins of this division to Peltzman's (1992) seminal study of presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections in the United States, which initiated research on linking deficit spending to the probability of re-election. Peltzman's famous finding that voters in the US behave as 'fiscal conservatives' implied that incumbents on both national and local levels get punished for pre-electoral increases in spending. This led Peltzman to conclude that deficit financing is electorally costly, but has left him unable to explain the vast growth of government spending (and public debt) over the preceding four decades (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000 ). Peltzman's conclusions have been re-examined in a number of different contexts with the literature divided regarding the portability of his findings. Brender (2003) confirmed Peltzman's results for voters in Israel, where higher deficits and larger debts reduced the probability of re-election, while Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998) found the same negative effect of budget deficits in US legislative elections. Using a panel of developed and established democracies, Brender and Drazen (2008) also confirmed that voters punished governments which ran high pre-electoral budget deficits. However, they failed to find a similar effect for less developed countries and younger democracies.
On the other hand, a number of studies have suggested the opposite, namely that higher spending prior to elections increases incumbent electoral chances. Rosenberg (1992) for Israel; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) for Brazil; Jones, Meloni and Tommasi (2012) for Argentina; and Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) for Spain all confirmed the existence of a local political business cycle where high-spending local officials have greater re-election probabilities. The crucial issue has also, however, been the type of spending. Drazen and Eslava (2010) looked at the composition of government spending in Colombian municipalities and found that voters positively respond to the pre-electoral increase in targeted spending on infrastructure. Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Baleiras and da Silva Costa (2004) also found evidence of an opportunistic political business cycle in Portugal, where specific types of government spending which the voters recognise as highly visible -usually infrastructural projects -increase electoral chances. Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) reported very similar findings for Spanish local governments.
Even in Peltzman's (1992) seminal article, once investment in roads is included in his main federalism implies much harder budget constraints for local governments, which are fully aware that voters will perceive any increase in local spending to be taken directly out of their pockets. This induces voters to demand more accountability and responsibility from their politicians, thus punishing any unnecessary pre-electoral increase in spending. Though the institutional explanation suggested by Jones, Meloni and Tommasi (2012) certainly has its appeal, it seems that even voters in institutional environments of fiscal federalism with hard budget constraints are not electorally immune to the allure of pork-barrel spending on lucrative infrastructure projects (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Bickers and Stein, 2000) .
The debate on whether voters are fiscally liberal or conservative, therefore, seems to still be inconclusive. Both camps in the literature on the political economy of local-level voter choice present compellingly elegant theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. Both, however, also suffer from substantial shortcomings and appear to be unable to account for conflicting observations. More importantly for our understanding of post-war political competition, they offer little guidance regarding possibly different dynamics at play in environments of post-conflict recovery. Unfortunately, the steadily expanding literature on elections and violent conflict also offers little help. Most efforts in this line of research have focused on the temporally proximate interrelationship of the two phenomena. What are the conditions under which elections lead to violent conflict or its relapse? Can violent conflict dynamics be transformed into democratic electoral competition? These are the types of questions which have garnered the most attention from researchers. Thus the literature on, for example, the potentially detrimental effects of poorly timed democratisation on societies mired by (latent) violent conflict is indeed substantial. Whereas our systematic understanding of the impact of war violence and destruction on the nature of postwar electoral competition -save for some valuable case studies of individual post-conflict elections (e.g. Harris, 1999; Manning, 2001) or the impact of ethnic violence on post-war ethnic politics (e.g. Hadzic et al., 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017) -is very limited.
Theoretical propositions: Exposure to war violence and voter choice
Implicit in the classic political economy arguments regarding local-level voter choice is the understanding of voters' preferences as uniform and fixed. The institutional arrangements may differ from polity to polity, but voters everywhere are assumed to be rational and self-interested. A growing body of work is showing, however, that preferences are not stable, uniform, fixed, or even rational. Voters make mistakes (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Leigh 2009; Healy et al. 2010) . They are cognitively and emotionally biased (Achen and Bartels 2013; Hill et al. 2012) . They are often driven by ultimately irrational heuristics like ideology or partisanship (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Tilley and Hobolt 2011) . The conception of voters as retrospective evaluators of governmental performance with uniform processes of preference formation may be elegant, but it does not correspond to reality. Our understanding of how exposure to various forms of war violence fits into the reality of voter choice, however, is limited and fragmentary at best. These growing fragments of evidence, however, are beginning to demonstrate something of critical importance for our conceptions of post-war voter choice. They are suggesting that traumatic experiences and the way individuals deal with them can have a long-lasting impact on preferences and opinions when it comes to a host of political and economic issues.
Research has shown, for example, that the psychologically traumatic experiences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted the affected individuals' political preferences away from liberalism and toward conservatism (Bonanno and Jost, 2006) . Scholars have also shown that exposure to terrorism in general can make individuals turn toward non-democratic attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009) and lower their support for peace efforts (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014) . Exposure to violencepersonal or familial -was furthermore shown to not only reduce trust (Cassar et al., 2011) and intensify ethnic identity (Rohner et al., 2013; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017) , but also to have some positive effects on individuals' political behaviour such as participating in community meetings, being politically active, and voting (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009 ). There are strong indications that these effects seem to last long after the actual violence has ended (Rozenas et al., 2017) . Similarly, individuals' experiences of traumatic economic hardship during their formative years have been shown to lead to lasting changes in a string of beliefs about the workings of the economy. People who grew up during recessions have been shown to be more likely to believe in the importance of luck for financial success and more inclined to distrust political institutions (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009) . In other words, virtually all aspects of individuals' political livesfrom participation to attitudes toward democracy -have been shown to be subject to the decisive influence of exposure to traumatic life experiences.
Here it is particularly important to highlight the advances in our understanding of the impact of traumatic experiences on one fundamental aspect of individuals' political and economic calculus, namely their risk aversion. Save for a couple of exceptions (Eckel et al., 2009; Voors et al., 2012) , the near consensus in the literature is that exposure to traumatic events makes individuals more risk averse. Whether it is tsunamis in Thailand (Cassar et al., 2011) , floods and earthquakes in Indonesia (Cameron and Shah, 2015) , war in Korea (Kim and Lee, 2014) , the Great Depression (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) , financial crises (Guiso et al., 2013) , terrorist attacks (Sacco et al., 2003) , or losing a child (Bucciol and Zarri, 2015) -experiences of personal trauma seem to be affecting the individuals' preference functions and making them more risk averse. Three aspects of this body of research are particularly significant to note. First, these effects can be very long-lasting, possibly even permanent (Voors et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2014) . Second, it seems it is the feeling of psychological distress that matters, not the actual experiences per se (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009) . And third, much more work is needed to parse out the importance of priming triggers in the whole story. There is a strong possibility that traumatic experiences can have decisive influence not on risk preferences, but on susceptibility to being primed to recall fear which in turn can lead to risk aversion (Callen et al., 2014) .
The findings made in this area of research form the backbone of our principal proposition. We suggest that war-related trauma, likely through increased risk aversion, could lead to voters favouring proactive political forces which offer economic security through fiscally expansionist policies. Moreover, in post-war polities these individual-level effects are likely to be compounded by the fact that the repercussions of violence and destruction last long after the wars 'officially' end. In some cases, civilian suffering through sickness, disability, and war-related deaths even intensifies after the period of active warfare (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003) . And in the environment of plummeting investment (Collier, 1999; Gupta et al., 2004) , forgotten workforce skills (Collier and Duponchel, 2012) , and lost and misplaced entrepreneurial talent (Sanders and Weitzel, 2013) , postwar reconstruction of the countries' physical and economic capacities stutters for decades. Simply put, wars change societies. They are also likely to change voters' expectations of what the government should do and their outlook on the social world around them (Strabac and Ringdal, 2008; Hutchison, 2014) . Wars also change the real needs of the population -needs that can most often be satisfied only by governmental action. In an environment of dwindling state capacity and high risk of conflict relapse, this places tremendous pressure on post-war policy makers, because progress toward sustainable peace depends on economic recovery (Collier et al., 2003; Flores and Nooruddin, 2009) , and economic recovery to a great extent depends on governmental performance (Kang and Meernik, 2005) .
This argument leads us to two propositions. First, we hypothesise that on the individual level personal feelings of war trauma have an impact on voters' opinions regarding the role of the government in the economy. More specifically, we hypothesise that individuals feeling war trauma are more likely to support fiscally proactive and redistributive government policies. A growing body of work in economic psychology suggests that preferences are neither uniform nor immutable, and that significant traumatic experiences can change preferences in a substantive and long-lasting way.
We want to establish if that is indeed the case when it comes to war trauma and individuals' opinions regarding the appropriate economic role of the government. And second, we wish to extend this individual-level analysis and contribute to the ongoing debate about the fiscal conservatism/liberalism of voters by establishing whether spending has an impact on the re-election chances of incumbent municipal mayors and whether this impact is conditioned by the communities' level of exposure to war violence. Our hypothesis is that the aforementioned individual-level dynamics do indeed translate into votes on the aggregate level, and that fiscally expansionist incumbents fare better electorally in areas harder hit by war violence. In other words, we hypothesise that post-war voters are fiscally liberal.
Individual-level data and method: War trauma and governmental interventionism
As stated earlier, the individual-level analysis presented in this study is based on data generated by This project covered seven states of South-East Europe in a series of nationally representative samples with a combined total of nearly 22,000 respondents. The Croatian sample relevant for this study included 1,250 respondents from all 21 Croatian counties with several hundred variables covering a variety of demographic characteristics, attitudes, and opinions. The SEESSP project is particularly valuable for its data on respondents' war trauma and experiences. For the purposes of our study, we created a seven-point scale capturing the incidence of various war-trauma sentiments among survey respondents. This is our principal explanatory variable of interest. We decided to focus on the sentiments of war-related trauma, rather than war experiences, guided by past research which has shown that it is indeed war-related psychological distress that matters in altering political preferences (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009 ). Individuals were thus assigned values between 0 (no trauma) and 6 (high trauma) based on whether they were having: 1) thoughts or memories about a traumatic war-related event; 2) recurrent distressing dreams about a traumatic war-related event; 3) a recurrent sense of reliving past war trauma in the present; 4) persistent intense emotional or physical distress at exposure to war-trauma cues; 5) persistent avoidance of certain conversations, ideas, or activities that arouse painful war-related memories; or 6) persistent loss of memory for important parts of war trauma. The average value for all survey respondents on this war trauma scale was slightly higher than 1, with more than 38% of respondents reporting at least some warrelated trauma sentiments.
As the dependent variable in the individual-level section of analysis, we crafted a composite measure capturing to which extent respondents believe that the government should intervene in the running of the economy. We opted for a composite scale here because we believe it can help us improve reliability and validity compared to individual indicators. We therefore created the Government interventionism variable using four statements from the SEESSP survey which we believe perfectly capture what we are after: 1) "It is the responsibility of government to reduce the differences in income"; 2) "The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one"; 3) "The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living"; and 4) "The state should intervene in the economy to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and weak". Response categories ranged from strong disagreement (1) to strong agreement (5). As Table 1 demonstrates, principal component analysis suggests that the four items scale very well, with Cronbach's Alpha at more than 0.8 and factor loadings ranging between 0.6 and 0.78. Following Dyrstad (2012), we created both a simple additive scale and a scale based on factor scores. Due to their exceptionally high correlation (0.999), we opted for the simpler scale because of its easier interpretation.
[ Table 1 about here]
Our principal explanatory variable of interest War trauma is accompanied by a string of control variables listed in Table 2 . Though they are all self-explanatory, three deserve additional attention:
Veteran, Happiness, and Local optimism. We include veteran status as a control variable to test for possible differences between respondents with military and civilian backgrounds because of their markedly different experiences of war violence and post-war socialization. And we include Happiness and Local optimism as control variables to test for possible intervening impacts of the personal feeling of well-being, as well as of the positive or negative conditions in the local environment. Our variables are then used to estimate a number of OLS regression models. We test for possible problems of multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF) for all independent variables and find none of them exceeding 2 (with the mean values of about 1.3).
[ Table 2 
about here]
Aggregate-level data and method: Modelling incumbents' electoral fortunes Finding reliable data for post-conflict polities, particularly on the sub-national level, is difficult. This was also true of Croatia, despite its solid public statistics when compared to other similar cases. Our primary units of analysis are Croatia's 556 municipalities. The data we use were collected over a two-and-a-half-year period from four institutions of the Croatian government -National Electoral Commission (DIP), Croatian Employment Service (HZZ), Tax Administration (Porezna uprava), and the National Bureau of Statistics (DZS) -as well as from the 556 municipal authorities. The data cover a fifteen-year period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) and include four cycles of local elections (2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017) . We complement this data with a set of variables covering the four pre-war years (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and capturing the level of state-sector investments as well as municipal spending on education, health, and social services (Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1989 (Savezni zavod za statistiku, , 1990 (Savezni zavod za statistiku, , 1991 (Savezni zavod za statistiku, , 1992 . We do that in an attempt to control for possible effects of pre-war patterns of local government fiscal activism. The definitions of the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 about here]
Several issues need to be noted here. First, our analysis is concerned only with municipalities where mayors remained in office throughout the whole term, which accounted for more than 90% of the cases. We opted for this choice because the inclusion of municipalities where there were mid-term -2004, 2006-2008, 2010-2012, and 2014-2016 respectively. Fourth, due to different reporting and accounting standards in the pre-war period, our pre-war variables are not perfectly comparable to the ones from the post-war period. Nevertheless, we believe they capture the fiscal activities of pre-war local governments rather well and enable us to factor in possible effects of pre-war patterns of spending and government investment. Finally, we should also note that as controls we include the variables Mayor alignment, Candidates, and the dummies for Croatia's regions to capture possible spillover effect of national politics, supply of local electoral alternatives, and regional dynamics respectively.
A few words are also needed to explain our modelling of the legacy of war violence in Croatia's municipalities. Obviously, war leaves a complex imprint on society with consequences ranging from direct physical damage and human loss to indirect costs in lower economic activity and misallocation of resources. Capturing the multitude of war effects is, therefore, nearly impossible -particularly when, as in Croatia's case, there are still no reliable casualty or physical destruction figures on the municipal level. This is why we chose to create the variable War disabled using the 2001 census data which captured the number of disabled people whose cause of disability was the 1991-1995 war.
Although far from ideal, the 2001 disability figures undeniably offer the best and most reliable method of capturing the effects of war violence on the population in the Croatian communities. Our Figure 1 presents the map of Croatia with the disability figures on the municipal level. As is obvious, the darker areas closely follow the war's frontline which became frozen with the January 1992
Sarajevo peace agreement which ushered in the arrival of UN forces. In our opinion, this is further evidence of the usefulness of this variable.
[ Figure 1 about here]
As stated earlier, the aggregate-level empirical tasks are: 1) to contribute to the ongoing debate about the fiscal conservatism/liberalism of voters by establishing whether spending has an impact on the re-election chances of incumbent municipal mayors; and 2) to uncover whether the communities' different experiences of war violence have an impact on voters' calculus. In order to fulfil these empirical tasks, we estimate a series of models with Incumbent Vote as our dependent variable. The explanatory variables of our primary interest are Spending and its interaction with War disabled. Since Incumbent Vote is a proportional variable distributed on a unit interval (0,1), we apply the fractional logit model with a Bernoulli quasi-likelihood specification (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) separately for each electoral cycle in our sample (2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017) .
We use a robust estimation of standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity, and -as in the individual-level portion of our analysis -test for possible multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF) for all explanatory variables in our non-interactive models. Once again, we find their values well below the maximum recommended values, with the mean value of about 2.3.
Considering the questions we are interested in, one would ideally employ some form of differencein-differences regression analysis in order to more adequately capture the effects of exposure to war violence on communities' fiscal liberalism. Unfortunately, such a design is not possible due to the absence of democratic elections in Croatia's pre-war political life. In other words, there is no real pre-war record of Croatian voters' fiscal liberalism or conservatism. Croatian voters were able to vote in relatively free multiparty local elections only once before the war: in 1990. Full results of those elections, however, have not been published. Even if they have, we believe analysing only one pre-war electoral cycle would not have been enough to pursue the diff-in-diff methodological strategy. Therefore, we suggest that the empirical approach we ultimately chose is the most appropriate, considering the limitations of the data and the historical context.
Results and interpretations
The results of our individual-level analysis are presented in Table 4 . We estimate four models to parse out the effects of War trauma on Government interventionism independent of the respondents' Veteran status. Our results clearly demonstrate that the sentiments of war trauma have an independent (i.e., not conditional), statistically significant, and substantively important effect on individuals' opinion of the government's role in the economy. Individuals experiencing feelings of war-related trauma -whether of military or civilian background -have a clear preference for a more interventionist role of the government in the economy. As we have argued, they turn to the government for economic security, possibly due to their greater general risk aversion. (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) Here we should also note that, as a form of robustness check, we performed the same analysis on the four disaggregated components of Government interventionism and achieved substantively nearly identical results. War trauma has a positive and statistically significant effect on respondents' views regarding the role of government in: 1) reducing income differences; 2) ensuring employment; 3) guaranteeing a minimum standard of living; and 4) protecting the poor and the weak. What is particularly notable, War trauma qualifies as one of top-three variables influencing respondents' attitudes toward the government's role in the economy, together with Religiosity and Settlement size. Its importance for our understanding of the post-war population's attitudes toward possibly the most fundamental political economy question is therefore undeniable.
[ Table 4 about here]
When it comes to our aggregate-level analysis, Table 5 presents the results of our models for all four electoral cycles with Incumbent vote as the dependent variable. Coefficients reported in the table are average marginal effects, instead of the usual log odds obtained via maximum likelihood estimation, to facilitate more useful and easier interpretation. Here we should also note that, as a robustness check, we performed the same analysis using OLS and had virtually identical results. The non-interactive models 1, 3, 5, and 7 have Spending as the principal explanatory variable of interest, and models 2, 4, 6, and 8 present the analysis with the variable Spending interacted with War disabled. Two things are immediately apparent. First, models 1, 3, 5, and 7 convincingly demonstrate that spending has a consistently strong and positive effect on incumbent vote share. And second, models 2, 4, 6, and 8 show that this effect is clearly conditioned by the municipalities' exposure to war violence.
[ Table 5 What is equally important, however, is that our interactive models 2, 4, 6, and 8 show that there are differences among Croatian municipalities based on the level of exposure to war violence. Voters in areas which experienced greater levels of war violence seem to exhibit different policy preferences when compared to their compatriots living in areas which were lucky enough to avoid the heaviest fighting. In each one of the four elections, the interactive term Spending x War disabled has a positive and statistically significant effect on Incumbent vote. Simply put, voters in areas that were more exposed to war violence are more fiscally liberal. They tend to reward incumbents for increased spending at greater rates than their compatriots who live in areas which were not as heavily affected by war violence.
In interpreting our results here, we will use the provisions of Croatia's Reconstruction Act of 1996 (Zastupnički dom, 1996) , which accorded the status of reconstruction areas to 163 municipalities which had been directly exposed to combat operations and had significant war damages. In those 163 municipalities, the average value of War disabled was 16.2, whereas in the remaining This finding that conditions fiscal imprudence to exposure to war violence could obviously be biased.
It is possible that war-affected areas were fiscally liberal even before the war, which could imply that their voters' desire for greater government spending in the post-war period would not be conditioned on war but simply a reflection of their pre-existing pattern of economic interaction with the (then socialist) government. As stated above, however, the problem with testing this directly is that before the war Croatia was governed by one-party rule and held relatively free and fair local elections only once. Detailed electoral results for those local elections have not been published, making comparisons in pre-war and post-war voting outcomes, unfortunately, impossible.
What is possible, however, is to include variables of pre-war municipal spending and pre-war levels of state/social sector investments in order to examine whether pre-war patterns of local government fiscal activity had any long-lasting impact on the communities' electoral preferences. If communities have been "trained" to depend on local government spending because of their relative underdevelopment or because of any other reason rooted in the local pre-war socioeconomic context, then we should notice some effect between our two pre-war variables and post-war electoral outcomes that reward incumbents which redistribute more. However, as the values in Table 5 show, there is no such effect present in any of the electoral years. Here we should note that we also performed our analyses using a number of variations of the two variables (not logged, extended to the whole 1980s, etc.), as well as including their interactions with our principal post-war variables of interest -and we still found no effect on incumbent vote share in any election. We also performed the same analyses using a battery of variables capturing the pre-war level of economic development -from municipal unemployment to the proportion of the local population that is economically active -and the results were virtually unchanged. Although these robustness tests do not solve our endogeneity problem, they do offer a good indication that pre-war patterns of local government economic activity did not impact voter choices after the war. We believe we can, therefore, safely conclude that exposure to war violence was clearly an important factor in rendering a community more fiscally liberal.
Finally, it should be mentioned that some of our findings when it comes to control variables are also noteworthy, particularly our two measures capturing the context of political competition. As could have been expected, and in line with previous research (e.g. Krebs, 1998), the clearest effect on incumbent vote share is exhibited by the variable Candidates which measures the number of electoral competitors vying for the mayoral post. Thus each additional candidate on average reduces support for the incumbent between 4.0 and 7.9 percentage points. Moreover, and in line with previous findings (Gélineau and Bélanger, 2004; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008 ) the effect of incumbent mayors' political alignment with the national government seems to depend on the performance of the national economy. In 2005, when Croatia's economy was experiencing a healthy GDP growth of 4.2 percent, political alignment of mayors with the national government brought them 5.3 percentage points at the polls. In 2013, on the other hand, when Croatia's GDP experienced negative growth of -0.9 percent, political alignment of mayors with the national government decreased their vote share by four percentage points. Generally speaking, incumbents seem to do worse in less populous municipalities with better educated voters, higher rates of unemployment, and when confronted by a higher number of challengers.
Conclusions
In this study we primarily wanted to answer one question: is there something fundamentally different in the way post-war voters evaluate political incumbents? We focused our attention on what we consider the most fundamental political issue, namely the role of the government in the running of the economy. Simply put, we wanted to determine if war makes people more fiscally conservative or liberal. Guided by the growing body of work which suggests that traumatic experiences can make individuals more risk averse, we theorised that voters' war-related sentiments of trauma made them more inclined to support a proactive role of government in the economy. We The most obvious implication of our study with regards to the relationship of the legacy of war and voters' calculus is that there seems to be yet another way in which war affects societies after the actual violence has ended: it makes the affected populations (more) fiscally liberal. At face value, even without our individual-level findings regarding the effect of war trauma on attitudes toward governments' economic interventionism, this would seem natural. Voters living in communities which have experienced violence and destruction have greater needs and expectations from their governments. They want their roads and buildings to be fixed and their firms and economic enterprises to get back in business, so that their lives can return to normalcy as soon as possible.
Policy makers who use the public purse to help make that happen get rewarded at the polls. Our findings regarding the impact of war-related trauma, however, suggest the reasons for this dynamic are even deeper and lay in voters' altered political preferences. Voters experiencing war-related trauma turn to the government for economic security and thus turn to political leaders to provide that security. These are important findings for our understanding of post-war political competition and consequently of the political economy of post-war reconstruction.
What is equally important to note is that these trends persist even nearly two decades after the war has ended. This dynamic can be explained in one of two possible ways: either 1) the challenges of post-war reconstruction and recovery -both personal and social -last longer than expected; or 2) the pattern of electoral reward and punishment between voters and political office-holders is altered in a long-lasting manner. Determining which combination of these two explanations comes closest to the truth is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a question that deserves our utmost attention. Post-war societies usually have weak institutions and even weaker safeguards against corruption and clientelism. A system which electorally rewards incumbents for fiscal largesse is particularly prone to both phenomena. In other words, the very real needs of post-war populations and their understandable hopes and demands from policy makers for government activism in the process of reconstruction and economic recovery could also set them down the path of public sector dependency and political populism for years to come after the violence ends. Developing institutional mechanisms which would help prevent such developments could be one of the most challenging aspects of post-war reconstruction.
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